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Abstract
Background: Pay-for-performance is an increasingly popular approach to improving health care quality, and the US
government will soon implement pay-for-performance in hospitals nationwide. Yet hospital capacity to perform (and
improve performance) likely depends on local resources. In this study, we quantify the association between hospital
performance and local economic and human resources, and describe possible implications of pay-for-performance for
socioeconomic equity.
Methods and Findings: We applied county-level measures of local economic and workforce resources to a national sample
of US hospitals (n=2,705), during the period 2004–2007. We analyzed performance for two common cardiac conditions
(acute myocardial infarction [AMI] and heart failure [HF]), using process-of-care measures from the Hospital Quality Alliance
[HQA], and isolated temporal trends and the contributions of individual resource dimensions on performance, using
multivariable mixed models. Performance scores were translated into net scores for hospitals using the Performance
Assessment Model, which has been suggested as a basis for reimbursement under Medicare’s ‘‘Value-Based Purchasing’’
program. Our analyses showed that hospital performance is substantially associated with local economic and workforce
resources. For example, for HF in 2004, hospitals located in counties with longstanding poverty had mean HQA composite
scores of 73.0, compared with a mean of 84.1 for hospitals in counties without longstanding poverty (p,0.001). Hospitals
located in counties in the lowest quartile with respect to college graduates in the workforce had mean HQA composite
scores of 76.7, compared with a mean of 86.2 for hospitals in the highest quartile (p,0.001). Performance on AMI measures
showed similar patterns. Performance improved generally over the study period. Nevertheless, by 2007—4 years after public
reporting began—hospitals in locationally disadvantaged areas still lagged behind their locationally advantaged
counterparts. This lag translated into substantially lower net scores under the Performance Assessment Model for hospital
reimbursement.
Conclusions: Hospital performance on clinical process measures is associated with the quantity and quality of local
economic and human resources. Medicare’s hospital pay-for-performance program may exacerbate inequalities across
regions, if implemented as currently proposed. Policymakers in the US and beyond may need to take into consideration the
balance between greater efficiency through pay-for-performance and socioeconomic equity.
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Pay-for-performance is an important market-based approach to
improving health care quality. During the past decade, the
approach has been adopted widely, by health systems in the UK
[1], Australia [2], and Taiwan [3], among others. Pay-for-
performance has also been used in the US, but in a piecemeal
fashion, in some states, by some insurance firms, for some health
care providers [4]. Now a unified effort is underway, with the US
government poised to implement pay-for-performance nationwide
within its Medicare health insurance program [5,6]. As the
provider of near-universal health insurance to Americans age 65 y
and older, Medicare is a powerful driver of US health care policy.
For example, Medicare was the innovator in the introduction of
hospital prospective payment under the Diagnosis Related Groups
[DRGs] program [7]. That payment reform was in turn adopted
in the private health insurance sector, and is the standard
throughout the US today. Medicare reforms also resonate
internationally, as evidenced by the widespread implementation
of the DRG case mix approach in 25 nations worldwide [8].
Pay-for-performance assumes that providers have adequate
economic and human resources to perform, or improve their
performance, within a short time frame. Yet the prevailing
distribution of resources in the US health care system makes it
difficult for some providers to operate effectively as it is [9].
Payment based on performance may worsen inequalities, as
hospitals in underresourced areas lose funds to their better-off
counterparts, with the government acting as a sort of ‘‘reverse
Robin Hood.’’
This scenario is not entirely far-fetched. In the US, hospital
revenues are largely derived from a mix of private and public
health insurance payments, which vary with local socioeconomic
conditions [9]. Strong finances give hospitals the opportunity to
invest in quality improvement [10]. Hospitals also draw on local
human resources. Arguably the most important of these is clinical
staff. But not all facilities have access to a high quality talent pool.
To date, much research and policy attention has been directed
toward attracting physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and other
clinicians to areas that would be otherwise underserved, because
of local poverty, limited spousal employment opportunities, and
sub-par schools [11–13].
Moreover, the US—and the world at large—is increasingly
segregated, both economically and in terms of educational level
[14–16]. Demographers in the US have noted a growing
concentration of college-educated people in a relatively small
subset of geographical areas [16]. This ‘‘regional concentration of
human capital’’ has translated into higher productivity in places
with more educated workforces, and a decline of economies in
areas where this advantage is lacking [17,18]. Although there is
evidence that clinical outcomes vary by geographical area [19],
little research has explored the impact of the regional concentra-
tion of wealth and human capital on health care.
In this study, we examine the association between local
resources and hospital performance, seeking to understand the
potential redistribution of funds under an important pending
change in hospital reimbursement. We also explore the implica-
tions of our findings for health systems beyond the US, as pay-for-
performance expands worldwide.
Methods
Setting
The US Medicare program is administered through the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a federal govern-
mental agency. Over the past decade, the CMS has piloted pay-
for-performance in a variety of settings [6]. Under the agency’s
ambitious ‘‘Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Initiative,’’ the first
wave of national implementation is slated to take place in
hospitals, which will have a portion of their revenues withheld
and then returned, conditional on their ability to meet quality
targets [6]. Later, the approach will be extended to payment for
other types of providers, including physicians, nursing homes, and
home health agencies [6].
Groundwork for hospital pay-for-performance was laid when, in
2004, the agency called for hospitals to voluntarily report their
performance on process-of-care measures for three clinical
conditions (acute myocardial infarction [AMI], heart failure
[HF], and pneumonia). Shortly thereafter, the agency began
providing financial incentives for reporting, under so called ‘‘pay-
for-reporting’’ [20]. The transition was to have been made to
hospital pay-for-performance in 2009, but with the change in
administration and focus on health care reform, that effort was
temporarily suspended. Nonetheless, pay-for-performance enjoys a
high degree of support in the agency, the Congress, the hospital
industry, and the Obama administration, and is widely expected to
be implemented, with the recent passage of health care reform
[21].
Data Sources and Sample
The performance data used in this study were derived during
Medicare’s voluntary reporting period from 2004–2007. Hospitals
were eligible for inclusion in the study if they were located in the
50 United States, and voluntarily reported to the Medicare
program under the Hospital Quality Alliance [HQA] program
during the period. We merged the HQA process-of-care data
(which are publicly posted on the program’s Hospital Compare
website [22]) with data on hospital characteristics and finances
from the Medicare Cost Reports [23]. These data were merged
with county-level information from the Health Resources and
Services Administration’s Area Resource File [24].
We used a dataset of institutions reporting at least some HQA
data for at least 1 y during the study period. Because a goal of the
study was to assess change in all measures over time, we limited
the study sample to those hospitals reporting on all seven measures
in both 2004 and 2007 (n=2,705; see below).
Measures
Composite HQA performance score. We used clinical
process-of-care measures for AMI and HF, two of the three
conditions for which process measures were collected under the
HQA throughout the study period. We do not present findings on
the third condition (pneumonia), because the initial measures for
that condition were controversial and were modified during the
study period [25]. However, findings for the pneumonia measures
were qualitatively similar to those reported here for AMI and HF,
albeit with somewhat attenuated impacts.
Detailed standards for these measures are published elsewhere
[26]. Consistent with previous research [27,28], we selected the
following individual measures in developing composite scores:
AMI (aspirin on admission, aspirin at discharge, angiotensin
converting enzyme [ACE] inhibitor for left ventricular dysfunc-
tion, beta-blocker on admission, beta-blocker at discharge); HF
(assessment of left ventricular function, ACE inhibitor for left
ventricular dysfunction). These are process measures that can be
successfully met by physician order or chart notation, including
documentation of a contraindication. We excluded measures of
the delivery of cognitive services such as smoking cessation
counseling that may be sensitive to patient characteristics [29]. For
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weighted average ‘‘composite’’ score, following a standard
methodology [30], which assigned each hospital a score ranging
from 0 to 100, reflecting the mean hospital performance on a
patient receiving the processes of care for which s/he was eligible,
for that condition.
Locational resources. We characterized hospital locational
resources at the county level across a set of dimensions. Local
economic conditions were measured in two ways. First, chronicity
of local poverty was assessed using a modified version of a metric
developed by the US Department of Agriculture’s Economic
Research Service [ERS], which identifies counties with respect to
their population poverty levels over the past four decennial census
periods (1970–2000). ‘‘Persistently poor’’ counties had .20% of
their population living in poverty in all four of those census years;
‘‘intermittently poor’’ counties met the .20% criterion during at
least one census year; and ‘‘never poor’’ counties never met the
.20% poverty level during any of the census years. The current
health of the local economy was summarized by the local
unemployment rate according to the 2000 census, using the
ERS cut point for ‘‘high’’ unemployment (,65% of residents 21–
64 y old employed).
Three measures reflected the availability and characteristics of
the local workforce. Availability of health professionals was
measured using the federal government’s Health Professional
Shortage Area (Primary Care) (HPSA) designation [31]. The
HPSA designation applied to the whole county, a portion of the
county, or to no portion of the county. The education level of the
local workforce was measured in two ways. The ERS’s ‘‘low
education’’ designation identifies counties for which .25% of
those aged 25–64 y do not have a high school diploma or
equivalent, based on the 2000 census [32]. Because the local
prevalence of college graduates is the standard measure of
workforce human capital used by economic geographers, we also
used the proportion of people aged 25 y and over who had
completed 4 y of college. For bivariate and multivariable analyses,
we divided the sample of hospitals into quartiles on the basis of the
prevalence of college graduates in the local county.
For each of the dimensions of locational resources, one resource
level was designated ‘‘locationally disadvantaged’’ (persistently
poor, high unemployment, entire county designated as HPSA,
high prevalence of non-high school graduates in workforce, lowest
quartile college educated). Dimensions of advantage/disadvantage
were moderately intercorrelated between counties, with unweight-
ed values of Cramer’s V ranging from 0.21 (HPSA designation
and prevalence of college graduates in the local county) to 0.56
(chronicity of local poverty and high unemployment).
Individual hospital characteristics. Measures of hospital
size and ownership were derived from the 2003 Medicare Cost
Reports. From the same source, the ratio of interns and residents
to beds was used to compute a 3-valued measure of teaching
status, with a cut point of 0.10 separating ‘‘major’’ and ‘‘minor’’
teaching institutions, and hospitals with a value of zero designated
as ‘‘non-teaching’’ [33]. Location was classified using the Office of
Management and Budget’s 2003 urban/rural continuum codes,
collapsed into three standard categories: ‘‘metropolitan,’’
‘‘micropolitan’’ (town or small city), and ‘‘non-core’’ (roughly,
rural). From the Cost Reports we computed the percent of bed
days attributable to Medicaid revenue, and total margin in 2003.
Cost Report data were unavailable for 175 (6.4%) of the hospitals.
Those institutions were excluded in multivariable analysis.
Attainment, improvement, and net performance score
(Performance Assessment Model). To assess potential
redistribution under VBP, we used the Performance Assessment
Model that is detailed in Appendix B of CMS’s November 2007
Report to Congress [5]. This model is ‘‘the methodology that
could be used for scoring hospital performance on specific
measures’’ in hospital VBP, according to CMS’s January 2009
Roadmap for Implementing Value Driven Healthcare in the Traditional
Medicare Fee-for-Service Program [6]. Under the model, hospitals are
assigned scaled two scores for each condition annually, one based
on attainment (absolute performance) and the other based on
improvement (increase in performance from the prior reporting
year). A net performance score is then assigned for each condition
equal to the attainment or improvement score, whichever is
greater.
We assigned these scores to hospitals using the model’s ‘‘standard’’
method, as illustrated in Figure 1. To determine the attainment score,
for each condition, for each year, there is an attainment range with an
upper limit benchmark (the mean of the top decile of performance for
all hospitals, for the previous year) and a lower limit attainment
threshold(the 50th percentileof performance for all hospitals, forthat
the previous year). Hospitals at or below the attainment threshold
receive 0 attainment points. Those at or above the benchmarkreceive
10 attainment points. Hospitals performing within the attainment
range receive a scaled score between 1 and 9 attainment points. A
similar scale methodology generates the improvement score, with the
upper benchmark fixed at the same level as for that measure’s
attainment score. However, the lower threshold is defined differently
for every hospital, and is set at the hospital’s performance score in the
previous period. Thus, the improvement scoring range varies across
hospitals, and requires a greater increase in the number of points on
the part of previous low-performers than previous high-performers in
order to obtain the same scaled score. We also assigned scores using
the model’s alternative method for ‘‘topped-out’’ measures [5].
Results of our analyses were not significantly changed.
Statistical Analysis
We began by describing the distribution of the sample of hospitals
with respect to the individual characteristics and locational resources
described above. Then, with hospitals as the units of analysis, we
computed mean annual composite HQA performance scores, for
each dimension of location, by resource level, and developed 95%
confidence intervals (CIs) around each mean. To formally test trends
in performance over time, for each condition and dimension, we
developed mixed models that included resource level, time, and their
interactions as fixed effects, along with random effects of hospital and
county, to reflect repeated measures for hospitals and clustering of
hospitals within counties. For each condition and dimension, we also
assessed differences in mean composite scores, comparing hospitalsat
the most and the least disadvantaged resource level for that
dimension, for the year 2004. These bivariate analyses incorporated
robust standard errors to account for the clustering of hospitals within
counties. The same set of analyses were conducted for the year 2007.
To assess the independent contributions of the dimensions of
location, we developed mixed multivariable models of composite
HQA performance score for each condition in 2004 and 2007,
entering the locational and hospital characteristics simultaneously
as fixed effects, with county as a random effect. We performed
regression diagnostics using the approach described by Belsley,
Kuh, and Welch [34], and the models performed favorably.
Finally, we examined bivariate differences in mean Performance
Assessment Model attainment, improvement, and net scores for
2007, for each condition, comparing hospitals at the most and
least disadvantaged resource level, within each locational dimen-
sion. For these tests, robust standard errors were used to correct
for the clustering of hospitals within counties.
Local Resources and Hospital Performance
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Again, the results were quantitatively similar; we present
unweighted statistics here.
Results
Although 4,786 different institutions reported HQA data for at
least 1 y during the study period, some did not report certain
measures during some years. Of the 3,698 hospitals that reported
at least one measure of AMI and HF performance in 2004, 3,147
(85.1%) reported on all seven of the measures used in this study in
that year, and of those, 2,705 (85.9%) were ‘‘complete reporters,’’
providing data on all seven measures again in 2007. These 2,705
hospitals formed the cohort for the present study. Compared to all
hospitals, complete reporters were disproportionately large, had a
teaching mission, and were comparatively advantaged in terms of
local economy and workforce. Analysis revealed that hospitals that
were complete reporters performed at a higher level than
noncomplete reporters, within every stratum of the five dimensions
of advantage/disadvantage. We performed sensitivity analyses to
assess the extent to which the inclusion criteria may have impacted
our findings, as reported below.
For most dimensions of locational resources, relatively few of the
sample hospitals are in counties with the lowest resource levels
(Table 1). For example, only 130 (4.8%) of hospitals are in counties
that have been persistently poor in the years 1970–2000, and 231
(8.5%) are in counties with high unemployment. Nevertheless, for
some dimensions, a substantial proportion of hospitals are in
relatively disadvantaged locations. For instance, 12.5% of hospitals
are in areas with a low prevalence of high school graduates, and
nearly 25% of hospitals are in areas where fewer than 16.2% of
local adults are college graduates. In all, 873 (32.7%) of the
hospitals in the sample are in a county that is locationally
disadvantaged on at least one dimension.
Trends in Performance
There was general improvement in mean composite score over
time (for all hospitals, for AMI, 1.62 points/year, 95% CI=
1.55–1.70; for HF, 3.33 points/year, 95% CI=3.24–3.40).
Details of the yearly trends in composite scores for the two
conditions are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The top panels in
Figure 2 (Figure 2A and 2B) shows trends defined by baseline
(2004) performance quartile. For both conditions, hospitals
starting in the lowest quartile showed the most improvement over
time (p,0.001 for a comparison of the linear time trend between
the first and fourth quartiles, for both conditions), but even by the
fourth year of reporting, those in the initial lowest quartile had not
reached parity with the other groups (p,0.001 for the difference of
means for the first and fourth quartile in 2007, for both
conditions). The remaining panels in Figures 2 and 3 display
performance trends over time for the five dimensions of locational
resources, stratified by resource level. For all five dimensions,
hospitals at the most disadvantaged level of resources fared
relatively poorly at the outset (p,0.001 for the difference between
hospitals at the most and least disadvantaged resource levels for all
dimensions, for both conditions), and that significant disadvantage
continued, but was attenuated over time (p,0.05 for the difference
in linear trend between hospitals at the most and least
Figure 1. Performance Assessment Model scoring example (standard method). For this example, the attainment threshold is 50 points,
and the benchmark is 90 points, based upon hospital performance nationwide during the previous year (see text). This hypothetical hospital received
a composite score of 30 during the preceding year, and a score of 75 during the current year. This is converted to attainment and improvement
scores, as follows: For the attainment score, the current year score falls in the attainment range, and the hospital is assigned a scaled attainment score
of 7. For the improvement score, the current year score falls in the improvement range, and the hospital is assigned a scaled score of 8. The overall
score is the larger of the two scores (a value of 8). Figure adapted from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Report to Congress (2007) [5].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000297.g001
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conditions, with the exception of health professional shortage for
AMI). By the fourth year of performance reporting, hospitals in
disadvantaged areas continued to lag significantly behind their
advantaged counterparts (p,0.001 for the difference in means
between hospitals at the least and most disadvantaged resource
levels for all dimensions, for both conditions) (Table S1).
Multivariable Analysis of Dimensions of Location
The five dimensions of location are conceptually interrelated, and
may be correlated with individual hospital characteristics. Table 2
shows the change in composite performance score independently
attributable to individual hospital characteristics, and then indepen-
dently attributable to each locational dimension, expressed as a
difference in score between each level and the most locationally
advantaged level, within each dimension. The data show consistent
independent effects for chronicity of poverty, entire county health
professional shortages, and percent college graduates, with levels of
chronicity of poverty and percent college graduates in the workforce
showing dose-response relationships to performance.
Location and Performance Assessment Model Score
Applying the Performance Assessment Model to the 2007 data
allowed calculation of attainment, improvement, and net Perfor-
mance Assessment Model scores (Table 3). Hospitals in more
advantaged locations had substantially higher attainment scores
(p,0.01 for all five dimensions in both AMI and HF). Hospitals in
advantaged locations also had higher improvement scores than
their disadvantaged counterparts, though differences in improve-
ment scores were narrower and not all statistically significant
(p,0.05 for all dimensions for AMI, but only for chronicity of
poverty and college graduates in the workforce for HF). For
locationally advantaged hospitals, attainment generally exceeded
improvement; the converse was true for disadvantaged hospitals.
The net result was that the Performance Assessment Model score–
the suggested basis for reimbursement under VBP–was consis-
tently higher for hospitals in the most advantaged locations than
those in the least advantaged locations, for both conditions and for
all five locational characteristics (p,0.02 for both conditions, all
five characteristics).
Sensitivity of Findings to Inclusion Criteria
To assess the sensitivity of our core findings to our ‘‘complete
reporters throughout’’ inclusion criteria, we conducted longitudi-
nal (2004–2007) analyses with the larger sample of hospitals that
reported completely in 2004 (n=3,147), as well as cross-sectional
(2007) analyses with complete reporters for AMI in that year
(n=3,074) and HF (n=3,908). In each case the results were
substantially equivalent to those reported here.
Discussion
We found that US hospitals operating in locations with richer
economic and human resources attained significantly higher clinical
process scores than those located in less advantaged areas during the
period 2004–2007. This pattern was evident along several dimensions
of the local economy and workforce. Over the study period, hospital
performance improved generally, with initially low-performing
hospitals showing the greatest increases. Since locationally disadvan-
taged hospitals were disproportionately low performers initially, they
showed more improvement over the 4-yperiod, and by the end of the
study period, disparities by degree of locational advantage had
decreased appreciably. Still, by the fourth year of public reporting,
locationally disadvantaged hospitals had not achieved scores
comparable to their advantaged counterparts.
Our finding of an association between location and perfor-
mance does not establish causality or specify a mechanism by
which the local economy or workforce affect quality. However, it
Table 1. US hospitals reporting on all seven HQA measures
from 2004 through 2007, according to individual
characteristics and locational resource levels.
Category Level n (%)
Individual characteristics
Number of beds ,100 beds 560 (21.2)
100–200 beds 866 (32.8)
.200 beds 1,214 (50.0)
Ownership Government 400 (15.0)
For profit 435 (16.2)
Voluntary 1,837 (68.7)
Teaching status Not a teaching hospital 1,675 (63.5)
Minor teaching hospital 494 (18.7)
Major teaching hospital 471 (17.8)
Urban/rural continuum
status
Non-core 334 (12.3)
Micropolitan 331 (12.2)
Metropolitan 2,040 (74.4)
Dependence on Medicaid
revenue (2003)
,6.60% 658 (25.3)
6.60%–11.99% 655 (25.2)
11.99%–18.76% 651 (25.0)
.18.76% 635 (24.4)
Total margin (2003) ,20.7 539 (21.6)
20.7 to .2.7 641 (25.7)
.2.7 to .6.8 642 (26.2)
.6.8 660 (26.5)
Locational resources
Chronicity of poverty
(1970–2000)
Persistently poor 130 (4.8)
Intermittently poor 530 (19.5)
Never poor 2,045 (75.6)
Extent of unemployment High 231 (8.5)
Not high 2,474 (91.5)
Health professional
shortage
Entire county 81 (3.0)
Portion of county 1,762 (65.1)
No portion of county 862 (31.9)
Non-high school
graduates in workforce
High prevalence 338 (12.5)
Not high prevalence 2,367 (87.5)
College graduates in
workforce
,16.2% college graduates 669 (24.7)
16.2–22.7% college
graduates
673 (24.8)
22.7–28.0% college
graduates
658 (24.3)
.28.0% college graduates 705 (26.1)
Total 2,705 (100)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000297.t001
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health management that suggests that effective human and
material resources are essential to hospital performance and
performance improvement, and that reported performance is only
as strong as the weakest link [35–40]. Moreover, regardless of the
causal history, the fact that better-endowed providers are
significantly better performers suggests that pay-for-performance
may transfer funds from providers in disadvantaged locations to
their better-endowed counterparts. This possibility has interna-
tional resonance, as is discussed below.
Limitations
We selected our process measures carefully to ensure that
variations in hospital performance are unlikely to reflect
differences in the characteristics of patients served by hospitals.
As noted previously, performance on the measures is satisfied by a
physician’s order, as documented by a medical records abstractor.
For example, in order for a hospital to have succeeded in satisfying
the process measure for ‘‘administration of an aspirin upon
admission,’’ there need only be an order in a patient record (or
documentation of a contraindication) that is reported to CMS.
Successfully meeting these criteria does not depend upon a patient
action or compliance, and is plausibly independent of patient
characteristics. Indeed, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commis-
sion (MedPAC) has discussed this matter, and has concluded that
risk adjustment for patient characteristics ‘‘is not necessary’’ for
these measures [41]. This recommendation is consistent with a
recent study that found that performance on the measures used in
Figure 2. Mean composite HQA performance scores (AMI and HF) for US hospitals, 2004–2007, stratified by various characteristics.
Graphics on the left-hand side (A,C,E) reflect temporal trends in composite performance scores for AMI, and those on the right hand side (B,D,F)
reflect temporal trends in composite performance scores for HF. (A and B) show mean composite performance score, stratified by performance
quartile in 2004. (C and D) show mean composite performance score, stratified by chronicity of poverty in county. (E and F) show mean composite
performance score, stratified by unemployment in county. In (A–F), mean composite scores are presented with 95% CIs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000297.g002
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ethnicity, within hospitals [29].
We would not suggest that location is the sole determinant of
performance. On the contrary, we found substantial within-county
variation in performance, some of which was correlated with hospital
characteristics including size, ownership, teaching status, and
financial strength. Accounting for within-location variation is beyond
the scope of this paper, although it is the focus of some of our ongoing
work. On a note related to locational determinism, we would not
suggest that hospitals necessarily hire and promote the best of local
talent. However, having a strong talent pool from which to draw
upon is likely to contribute to organizational strength, all else being
equal.
Our estimates of effect should be interpreted with some caution.
In measuring and assigning ‘‘location,’’ we used county as the
geographic unit for analysis, because it is the unit for which
information about the characteristics of interest is readily
available. However, locational characteristics of hospitals are not
necessarily fully defined at the county level. For example cross-
county commuting is common in some areas, with over 25% of
US workers nationwide crossing county boundaries to reach their
workplace [42]. To the extent that more educated workers are
drawn across county lines in order to work at high-performing
hospitals, the associations reported here understate the relation-
ship between workforce characteristics and hospital performance.
A related caveat pertains to variations in county size and
Figure 3. Mean composite HQA performance scores (AMI and HF) for US hospitals, 2004–2007, stratified by various characteristics.
Figure 3 continues the series begun in Figure 2. Again, graphics on the left-hand side (A,C,E) reflect temporal trends in composite performance scores
for AMI, and those on the right-hand side (B,D,F) reflect temporal trends in composite performance scores for HF. (A and B) show mean composite
performance score, stratified by health professional shortage in county. (C and D) show mean composite performance score, stratified by prevalence
of non-high school graduates in county. (E and F) show mean composite performance score, stratified by percent of college graduates in county. In
(A–F), mean composite scores are presented with 95% CIs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000297.g003
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227,556 square km [43]. Some counties are small rural areas;
others are entire metropolitan regions. Within large counties, there
is likely to be substantial heterogeneity of workforce and economic
characteristics. The assignment of average characteristics in such
counties is especially imprecise, and as a result our estimates of the
impact of location are again likely to be biased downward. To
explore this effect, we replicated our analyses, omitting hospitals in
counties with populations greater than 1 million, and then again
omitting hospitals in counties with populations greater than
500,000. As the sample was restricted to smaller counties,
estimates of locational impacts generally increased (analyses not
shown).
Other caveats have to do with representativeness and
generalizability. As we noted at the outset, locationally disadvan-
taged institutions were relatively underrepresented in our sample
Table 2. Independent effects of individual characteristics and locational resource levels on hospital composite performance scores
for AMI and HF, 2004 and 2007.
Category Level AMI HF
2004 2007 2004 2007
Individual hospital characteristics
Number of beds ,100 beds — — — —
100–200 beds 1.7** 1.7** 1.7** 1.8**
.200 beds 3.8** 3.3** 2.9** 3.0**
Ownership Government — — — —
For profit 20.9 0.9** 21.8** 0.7
Voluntary 0.7 1.0** 0.5 0.7*
Teaching status Not a teaching hospital — — — —
Minor teaching hospital 1.0** 0.3 0.8 0.5
Major teaching hospital 2.8** 1.4** 3.8** 1.3**
Urban/rural continuum status Non-core 0.2 20.4 24.8** 22.5**
Micropolitan 20.9 20.5 22.3** 20.2
Metropolitan — — — —
Medicaid revenue dependence (2003) ,6.60% 0.8 0.6* 0.7 0.5
6.60%–11.99% 0.9* 0.7* 1.1* 0.6
11.99%–18.76% 1.1* 0.2 0.7 0.5
.18.76% — — — —
Total margin (2003) ,20.7 — — — —
20.7 to .2.7 0.9* 0.9** 0.8 0.4
.2.7 to .6.8 2.3** 1.1** 2.0** 0.8*
.6.8 2.0** 1.3** 2.0** 0.6
Locational resources
Chronicity of poverty, (1970–2000) Persistently poor 23.9** 22.7** 24.4** 22.0*
Intermittently poor 22.8** 21.5** 22.3* 21.2*
Never poor — — — —
Extent of unemployment High 0.7 0.6 21.3 0.9
Not high — — — —
Health professional shortage Entire county 22.6** 22.7* 22.7* 22.2*
Portion of county 20.7 20.1 0.7 0.2
No portion of county — — — —
Non-high school graduates in workforce High prevalence 21.6** 21.9** 21.9* 0.5
Not high prevalence — — — —
College graduates in workforce ,16.2% college graduates 23.1** 21.9** 23.3** 21.9**
16.2%–22.7% college graduates 21.4** 21.2** 21.8 21.3*
22.7%–28.0% college graduates 21.0 21.0** 20.2 20.7
.28.0% college graduates — — — —
Statistics are derived from mixed models in which hospital characteristics and locational resources entered simultaneously; see text for details. Omitted (comparison)
groups are indicated with dashes.
*coefficient significant with p,0.05.
**coefficient significant at p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000297.t002
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their better-resourced counterparts. For example, in our sample
4.8% of hospitals were in ‘‘persistently poor’’ counties, but in the
nation at-large that figure is 7.5%. Therefore, while our sensitivity
analysis did not suggest bias in our estimates of the impact of
locational disadvantage, disadvantage is more prevalent than our
sample would suggest. In addition, we used process measures of
performance for only two clinical conditions. It remains to be seen
whether similar trends and patterns will be found, when data are
available for other conditions, or for measures of the outcomes of
care.
Finally, while our analyses suggest that Medicare’s pay-for-
performance will transfer funds from poorly resourced to better off
areas, we cannot assign dollar values to the transfers that are likely
to occur, for several reasons. First, our data derive from a period of
public reporting, and the addition of payment incentives may
influence provider behavior beyond those changes induced by
public reporting. Second, the specifics of payment remain to be
determined by the Congress and the CMS. Critical issues include
the percent of revenue to be withheld under the scheme, the extent
to which that revenue will be returned to providers (rather than
retained by the Medicare program [5,6]) and the translation of
performance scores to dollar amounts (the so-called ‘‘exchange
function’’ [5]).
Policy Implications
With respect to Medicare, CMS has acknowledged that pay-for-
performance may inadvertently worsen the lot of hospitals that
‘‘consistently face challenges in improving or maintaining their
performance’’ ([5], p. 85). In its Report to Congress, the agency has
outlined plans to monitor the distribution of funds as pay-for-
performance is implemented. If some subsets of hospitals are
disadvantaged under the payment reform, then those hospitals
could be offered training, site visits, and other forms of technical
assistance, the agency has suggested. Our work argues for a more
proactive approach. Rethinking the way that performance is
assessed could help avoid some of the ‘‘reverse Robin Hood’’
consequences that are foreshadowed by our analysis. As we have
noted, in its current published form, the Performance Assessment
Model credits improvement conditional on starting point. This
means that baseline low-attainers must have a greater absolute
score increase in order to ‘‘improve’’ as much as baseline high-
attainers. Since locationally disadvantaged hospitals are typically
baseline low-attainers, they are perforce less likely to be identified
as high performers under the model. Changing the model so that it
credits improvement regardless of starting point, or assesses
improvement over a longer time frame, could help make the
program more equitable. It is important to note that the
Performance Assessment Model, while referenced in multiple
Table 3. Mean Performance Assessment Model scores (attainment, improvement, and net score), by hospital locational resource
levels, US Hospitals, 2007.
Locational
Resource Level Mean (p-Value)
AMI HF
Attainment
Score
Improve-
ment Score Difference
Net
Score
Attainment
Score
Improve-
ment
Score Difference Net Score
Chronicity of
poverty
(1970–2000)
Persistently poor 1.6 (0.001) 3.0 (0.002) 21.3 (0.001) 3.6 (0.001) 2.5 (0.001) 3.3 (0.001) 20.8 (0.001) 4.0 (0.001)
Intermittently poor 2.6 3.2 20.6 4.0 3.5 3.9 20.3 4.7
Never poor 4.1 3.7 0.4 5.0 4.5 4.3 0.3 5.4
Extent of un-
employment
High 2.1 (0.001) 2.9 (0.002) 20.8 (0.001) 3.6 (0.001) 3.1 (0.001) 3.7 (0.053) 20.6 (0.001) 4.5 (0.001)
Not high 3.8 3.6 0.3 4.8 4.3 4.1 0.2 5.3
Health pro-
fessional
shortage
Entire county 1.7 (0.001) 3.4 (0.023) 21.5 (0.001) 3.9 (0.004) 3.1 (0.008) 3.8 (0.158) 20.7 (0.030) 4.4 (0.014)
Portion of county 3.7 3.5 0.2 4.7 4.2 4.0 0.2 5.1
No portion of county 3.9 3.8 0.2 5.0 4.4 4.4 0.0 5.4
Non-high school
graduates in
workforce
High prevalence 2.2 (0.001) 3.2 (0.001) 20.9 (0.001) 3.9 (0.001) 3.0 (0.001) 3.9 (0.081) 20.8 (0.001) 4.6 (0.001)
Not high prevalence 3.9 3.7 0.3 4.9 4.4 4.2 0.2 5.3
College graduates
in workforce
,16.2% college
graduates
2.2 (0.001) 3.3 (0.001) 21.1 (0.001) 4.0 (0.001) 3.1 (0.001) 3.9 (0.001) 20.7 (0.001) 4.5 (0.001)
16.2%–22.7% college
graduates
3.4 3.4 0.0 4.5 4.0 3.9 0.1 5.0
22.7%–28.0% college
graduates
4.1 3.7 0.4 5.1 4.7 4.3 0.4 5.5
.28.0% college
graduates
5.0 3.9 1.1 5.6 5.1 4.5 0.6 5.8
Details of the calculation of scores under the Performance Assessment Model (attainment, improvement, and net scores) are described in the text. Within each column,
within each dimension of locational resource, the p-value is derived from a test of the difference in means between hospitals at the most and least disadvantaged levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000297.t003
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preliminary. Thus, opportunities exist to modify and improve
upon the current version. Alternatively, rather than altering the
model, CMS may wish to consider comparing hospitals to their
similarly located peers, thereby enhancing equity through an
‘‘apples-to-apples’’ comparison. However this strategy carries the
risk of institutionalizing inequalities, and finding the right balance
may be difficult [44,45].
Do our findings apply beyond the US? While our specific
measures of locational disadvantage may not apply everywhere,
there are likely analogs in other settings. For instance, significant
health workforce inequalities can be found within and across
nations, around the world [46,47]. These are likely to translate
into regional differences in capacities to perform. A recent study in
the UK found that general practitioner practices in deprived areas
are disproportionately staffed by older physicians, and those who
received their medical training outside of the UK [48]. Both of
these provider characteristics were associated with poorer practice
performance under a pay-for-performance scheme. Deprived
areas had a disproportionate share of the lowest performing
general practices. In other words, location was linked to
performance among UK general practitioners, perhaps through
health workforce inequalities. While this remains to be explored in
future research, it implies (as does our work) that the pursuit of
efficiency through provider accountability may be at odds with
pervasive structural inequalities.
Such inequalities can be addressed through countervailing
policies. For example, in the UK, geographically targeted
approaches have been taken to overcome regional inequalities
under ‘‘deprivation payment’’ schemes [49]. In the US, there is no
comprehensive strategy to address regional resource inequalities as
they might affect health care delivery, although various policies
have supported health care in rural areas and in the so-called
‘‘safety net,’’ which includes institutions providing care to low
income people [11,50,51].
Despite claims that ‘‘the world is flat’’ [52]—that place is
irrelevant in a globally networked world—our work suggests that
location is a critical input to health care quality. Holding providers
accountable is not an unreasonable approach to quality improve-
ment. However, it must be done in a way that attends to the
profound inequalities in local circumstances that shape life in the
twenty-first century [14].
Supporting Information
Table S1 Numeric point estimates shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000297.s001 (0.10 MB
DOC)
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Background. These days, many people are rewarded for
working hard and efficiently by being given bonuses when
they reach preset performance targets. With a rapidly aging
population and rising health care costs, policy makers in
many developed countries are considering ways of
maximizing value for money, including rewarding health
care providers when they meet targets, under ‘‘pay-for-
performance.’’ In the UK, for example, a major pay-for-
performance initiative—the Quality and Outcomes
Framework—began in 2004. All the country’s general
practices (primary health care facilities that deal with all
medical ailments) now detail their achievements in terms of
numerous clinical quality indicators for common chronic
conditions (for example, the regularity of blood sugar checks
for people with diabetes). They are then rewarded on the
basis of these results.
Why Was This Study Done? In the US, the government is
poised to implement a nationwide pay-for-performance
program in hospitals within Medicare, the government
program that provides health insurance to Americans aged
65 years or older, as well as people with disabilities. However,
some observers are concerned about the effect that the
proposed pay-for-performance program might have on the
distribution of health care resources in the US. Pay-for-
performance assumes that health care providers have the
economic and human resources that they need to perform
or to improve their performance. But, if a hospital’s capacity
to perform depends on local resources, payment based on
performance might worsen existing health care inequalities
because hospitals in under-resourced areas might lose funds
to hospitals in more affluent regions. In other words, the
government might act as a reverse Robin Hood, taking from
the poor and giving to the rich. In this study, the researchers
examine the association between hospital performance and
local economic and human resources, to explore whether
this scenario is a plausible result of the pending change in US
hospital reimbursement.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? US hospitals
have voluntarily reported their performance on indicators of
clinical care (‘‘process-of-care measures’’) for acute
myocardial infarction (AMI, heart attack), heart failure (HF),
and pneumonia under the Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA)
program since 2004. The researchers identified 2,705
hospitals that had fully reported process-of-care measures
for AMI and HF in both 2004 and 2007. They then used the
‘‘Performance Assessment Model’’ (a methodology
developed by the US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services to score hospital performance) to calculate scores
for each hospital. Finally, they looked for associations
between these scores and measures of the hospital’s local
economic and human resources such as population poverty
levels and the percentage of college graduates in the
workforce. Hospital performance was associated with local
and economic workforce capacity, they report. Thus,
hospitals in counties with longstanding poverty had lower
average performance scores for HF and AMI than hospitals in
affluent counties. Similarly, hospitals in counties with a low
percentage of college graduates in the workforce had lower
average performance scores than hospitals in counties where
more of the workforce had been to college. Finally, although
performance improved generally over the study period,
hospitals in disadvantaged areas still lagged behind hospitals
in advantaged areas in 2007.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings indicate
that hospital performance (as measured by the clinical
process measures considered here) is associated with the
quantity and quality of local human and economic resources.
Thus, the proposed Medicare hospital pay-for-performance
program may exacerbate existing US health care inequalities
by leading to the transfer of funds from hospitals in
disadvantaged locations to those in advantaged locations.
Although further studies are needed to confirm this
conclusion, these findings have important implications for
pay-for-performance programs in health care. They suggest
that US policy makers may need to modify how they
measure performance improvement—the current
Performance Assessment Model gives hospitals that start
from a low baseline less credit for improvements than those
that start from a high baseline. This works against hospitals
in disadvantaged locations, which start at a low baseline.
Second and more generally, they suggest that there may be
a tension between the efficiency goals of pay-for-
performance and other equity goals of health care systems.
In a world where resources vary across regions, the
expectation that regions can perform equally may not be
realistic.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1000297.
N KaiserEDU.org is an online resource for learning about the
US health care system. It includes educational modules on
such topics as the Medicare program and efforts to
improve the quality of care
N The Hospital Quality Alliance provides information on the
quality of care in US hospitals
N Information about the UK National Health Service Quality
and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance initiative
for general practice surgeries is available
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